We present a simple, yet powerful, approach for the specification and enforcement of authorizations regulating data release among data holders collaborating in a distributed computation, to ensure that query processing discloses only data whose release has been explicitly authorized. Data disclosure is captured by means of profiles, associated with each data computation, that describe the information carried by a base or a derived (i.e., computed by a query) relation. We present an algorithm that, given a query plan, determines whether it can be safely executed and produces a safe execution strategy for it. For each operation in a safe query plan, the algorithm determines the server(s) responsible for the execution, based on the entailed information flows, considering different strategies for the execution of joins. Finally, we discuss the architecture of a distributed database system based on the proposed model, illustrating possible design choices and their impact.
Introduction
More and more emerging scenarios require different parties, each withholding large amounts of independently managed information, to cooperate with other parties in a large distributed system to the aim of sharing information and perform distributed computations. Such scenarios range from traditional distributed database systems, where a centrally planned database design is then distributed to different locations; to federated systems, where independently developed databases are merged together; to dynamic coalitions and virtual communities, where independent parties may need to selectively share part of their knowledge towards the completion of common goals. Regardless of the specific scenario, a common point of such a merging and sharing process is that it is selective: if on one hand there is a need to share some data and cooperate, there is on the other hand an equally strong need to protect those data that, for various reasons, should not be disclosed.
The correct definition and management of protection requirements is therefore a crucial point for an effective collaboration and integration of large-scale distributed systems. The problem calls for a solution that must be expressive to capture the different data protection needs of the cooperating parties as well as simple and consistent with current mechanisms for the management of distributed computations, to be seamlessly integrated in current systems. To this aim and for the sake of concreteness, in this paper we address the problem with specific consideration to distributed database systems. While noting that our approach can be extended to other data models, we also note that the emphasis on relational databases must not be considered a limitation. First, relational database technology currently dominates the management of data in most scenarios where collections of sensitive information have to be integrated over a network; even if a system offers access to the data using Web technology, the data offered by the system are extracted from a relational database and a description of the access policy in terms of the underlying relational structure offers a high degree of flexibility. Second, for integration solutions based on Web technology, and in particular systems relying on the use of Web services, it is always possible to model the structure of the exported data in terms of a relational representation. In this situation a description of the access policy according to our model, in contrast to a policy description on service invocations, typically provides a more robust and flexible identification of the security requirements of the application.
We consider a scenario where relations are distributed at different servers, query execution may require cooperation, and data are exchanged among the different servers involved in the query. Each server is responsible for the definition of the access policy on its resources. We propose an authorization model to regulate the view that each server can have on the data and ensure that query computation exposes to each server only data that the server can view. In our approach, authorizations regulate not only the data on which parties have explicit visibility, but also the visibility of possible associations that such data convey. Our simple authorization form essentially corresponds to generic view patterns, thus nicely meeting both expressiveness and simplicity requirements. A novel aspect of the model is the definition of distinct authorization profiles for different parties in the system and the explicit support for cooperative query evaluation. This is an important feature in distributed settings, where the minimization of data exchanges and the execution of a query step in locations where it can be less costly is a crucial factor in the identification of an execution strategy characterized by good performance.
In [11] we presented an early version of our proposal that here has been extended to possibly consider a third party (belonging to the system) as responsible for the execution of one or more operations composing a query plan, when none of the involved parties has the authorizations necessary for their computation. We then revise both the definition of safe executor assignment and of feasible query plan. The algorithm originally proposed in [11] , which determines whether and how a given query plan can be safely executed, has been changed to compute a safe executor assignment eventually involving a third party. In addition, we formally analyze the correctness and computational complexity of the novel algorithm and describe the architecture of a distributed database system that adopts the proposed model. The description of the architecture focuses on the possible design choices and their impact.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces preliminary concepts of the distributed data model and distributed query evaluation. Section 3 illustrates our security model. Section 4 discusses query planning and how protection requirements stated by authorizations must be considered in the query execution to ensure that data are properly protected within the distributed computation. Section 5 proposes an algorithm for determining whether a query plan can be executed in the respect of the authorizations and, if it exists, producing a safe assignment of tasks to the distributed cooperating parties for the execution of the query plan. Section 6 describes the architecture of a distributed database system implementing our security model. Section 7 discusses related work. Finally, Section 8 draws our conclusions. The proofs of the theorems are reported in Appendix A.
Preliminary concepts
We consider a distributed system composed of different servers, storing different relations. Each relation is represented as R(A 1 , . . . , A n ), where R is the name of the relation and A 1 , . . . , A n are its attributes. At the instance level, a relation is a set of tuples, where each tuple associates with each attribute in the relation a value in the attribute's domain. The primary key of a relation is the attribute, or set of attributes, that uniquely identifies each tuple in the relation. For the sake of simplicity, we assume all relations to have distinct names and all attributes in the different relations to have distinct names. While simplifying the notation, this assumption does not limit in any way our approach since relations/attributes with the same name can be made distinct by Patient and Physician of relation Hospital has been pushed down. On the right-hand side of Figure 2 there is a query tree plan for query q 2 , where the selection on attribute Disease of relation Hospital has been pushed down.
In the following, given an operation involving a relation stored at a server, we will use the term operand to refer indistinguishably to either the relation or the server storing it, when the semantics is clear from the context.
Security model
We first present our simple, while expressive, authorizations, regulating how data can be released to each server.
We then introduce the concept of relation profile that characterizes the information content of a relation.
Authorizations
Consistently with standard security practice, we assume a "closed policy", where data can be made visible only to parties explicitly authorized for that.
1 Authorizations have the following form. 1. Attributes is a set of attributes belonging to one or more relations;
2. Join Path is a join path including (at least) all the relations with attributes in Attributes, that is, whose release is authorized (the join path can be empty when all the attributes in Attributes belong to the same relation);
3. Server is a server in the distributed system.
The semantics of an authorization is that Server can be released (i.e., is authorized to view) the set Attributes of attributes of tuples resulting from the join operation described by Join Path. This form of authorizations, with the specification of the join path as a separate element, is quite expressive, yet simple and easily usable by DBAs.
Note that the join path may also include attributes appearing in relations that do not have any attribute in
Attributes. This may be due to two different reasons.
1. Connectivity constraints. The additional relations are needed to build a correct association among the attributes of other relations (i.e., the relations that are in the join path). For instance, in authorization 3
1 While we assume a closed policy, we note that our approach can be adapted to an "open policy" scenario, where data are visible by default and negative rules specify restrictions on the visibility that parties may have on the data [22] .
in Figure 3 attribute Patient in Hospital appears in the join path to establish the association between insurance holders and their treatments, but none of the attributes of Hospital are released. Note how the authorization allows the insurance company (server S I ) to view the treatment of its subscribers without need of knowing their illness.
2.
Instance-based restrictions. The additional relations are needed to restrict the values of attributes to be released to only those values appearing in tuples that can be associated with such relations. For instance, authorization 15 in Figure 3 allows server S N to view the illnesses of all the citizens appearing in the National Registry (i.e., tuples in Nat registry satisfying Citizen=Patient and Disease=Illness conditions) but not of those patients who are not registered. Note how instance-based restrictions can also be used to support situations where some information can be released only if explicit input is requested (the input is viewed in this case as a relation to be joined). For instance, with reference to the example just mentioned, providing the citizen identifier, server S N can retrieve the corresponding illness.
It is important to note that the presence of a join path in an authorization implies the release of fewer tuples (only those for which the conditions in the join path are satisfied), but it does not imply the release of less information. Indeed, releasing a tuple implicitly gives information on the fact that the tuple satisfies the join path, that is, that its values have an association with another relation (which might not be released). For instance, authorization 2 in Figure 3 gives S I not only the values of attribute Physician for its subscribers, but also the additional information about the fact that the subscriber has been hospitalized. We will come back to this observation when discussing access control evaluation.
Note also that, while expressive, our authorizations remain at the schema level, that is, they do not allow restricting access only to certain tuples, depending on the satisfaction of some conditions (apart from joins).
The reason for this is that including selection conditions in the authorizations would increase the complexity and reduce the applicability of the model.
Profiles and authorized views
Authorizations restrict the data (views) that can be released to each server. To determine whether a release should be authorized or not, we first need to capture the information content of a relation, either base or derived (i.e., computed by a query). To this purpose, we introduce the concept of relation profile. R π is the set of attributes in R (i.e., R's schema); R is the, possibly empty, join path used in the definition/construction of R; R σ is a, possibly empty, set of attributes involved in selection conditions in the definition/construction of R.
According to the definition above, the relation profile of a base relation
Also, according to the semantics of the relational operators, the profile resulting from a relational operation, summarized in Figure 4 , 2 is as follows.
• Projection (π). It returns a subset of the attributes of the operand. Hence, R and R σ of the resulting relation R are the same as the ones of the operand, while R π contains only those attributes being projected.
• Selection (σ). It returns a subset of the tuples of the operand. Hence, R and R π of the resulting relation R are the same as the ones of the operand, while R σ needs to include also the attributes appearing in the selection condition.
• Join ( ). It returns a relation that contains the association of the tuples of the operands, thus capturing the information in both operands as well as the information on their association (conditions in the join).
Hence, R σ and R π of the resulting relation R are the union of those of the operands, while R is the union of the join paths of the operands and the one of the operation.
A generic query of the form "select A from Joined Relations where C" then produces a derived relation whose profile is [A,J q ,Att C ], where A is the set of projected attributes, J q is the join path connecting the relations in the from clause of the query, and Att C are the attributes appearing in the where clause. In the following, when clear from the context, we use the term relation to refer to either a base relation or a derived relation.
According to the semantics of authorizations and of profiles, the visibility on the different relations by a server is regulated as follows.
Definition 3.3 (Authorized view). Given a set A of authorizations, a relation R with profile
and a server S, we say that S is authorized to view R iff ∃ [A, J]→S ∈ A such that both the following conditions hold: 1) R π ∪ R σ ⊆ A, and 2) R = J.
Definition 3.3 states that a relation can be released to a server only if there is an authorization permitting the release of (at least) all the attributes, either explicitly contained in the relation or appearing in the selection condition in its definition, and which has exactly the same join path as the relation. The reason for the subset in the first condition is that an authorization to view a superset of attributes implies the authorization to view a subset of them. One could think that a similar implication could also hold for join paths, and therefore that an authorization containing a join path could also authorize all relations that simply include the path (as the addition of further conditions simply restricts the set of tuples in the result). However, this implication cannot hold.
In fact, while decreasing the set of tuples belonging to the result, any additional join condition adds information on the fact that the tuples join with (i. Derived authorizations can be obtained by means of a "chase" procedure that computes all the authorizations implied directly or indirectly by those explicitly specified. Such closing process goes beyond the functionalities of the SQL standard, but is based on known results [2, 10] . Its treatment is outside the scope of the paper; we therefore do not discuss it further, and assume that authorizations are closed with respect to these derivations.
Safe query planning
Goal of this work is to determine whether and how the query can be computed without violating the defined authorizations. A necessary condition for the query execution is clearly that the requester be authorized to view the profile associated with the relation corresponding to the query result. As a matter of fact, there is no need of determining a plan for a query execution if its result cannot be made visible to the requester. In the following, we therefore consider queries whose profile can be viewed by the requester (queries for which such condition does not hold are discarded upfront). The definition of a plan for the query execution requires determining the data releases that each execution step entails, so that only executions implying authorized releases are performed. Since we can assume each server to be authorized to view the relation it holds, each unary operation (projection and selection) can be executed by the server itself, while a join operation can be executed if all the data communications correspond to authorized releases. Figure 5 summarizes the operations and the data exchanges needed to perform a relational operation, reporting, for every data communication, the profile of the relation being communicated (and hence the information exposure implied by it); data access by a server on its own relation is implicit. For each operation/communication we also show, before the ":", the server executing it. We note that a join operation R l J lr R r , where R l and R r represent the left and right input relations, respectively, can be executed either as a regular join or a semi-join. We call master the server in charge of the join computation and slave the server that cooperates with the master during the computation.
We then distinguish four different cases depending on whether the join is executed as a regular join or as a semi-join and on which operand serves as master (slave, respectively). The master/slave assignment is specified as a pair, where the first element is the operand that serves as master and the second element is the operand that serves as slave. • [S l ,null]: in the regular join processed by S l , server S r sends its relation to S l , and S l computes the join.
For execution, S l needs to be authorized to view R r , which has profile [R
• [S l ,S r ]: the semi-join requires a sequence of five steps. 1) S l computes the projection R J l of the attributes in its relation R l participating in the join. 2) S l sends R J l to S r ; this operation entails a data release characterized by the profile of R J l , which (according to Definition 3.
computes R J l r as the join between R J l and its relation R r . 4) S r sends R J l r to S l ; this operation entails a data release characterized by the profile of
the natural join between R J l r and its own relation R l .
Semi-joins allow reducing the flow of information: the slave server needs only to send those tuples that participate in the join, instead of its complete relation. in Figure 2 ) is executed as a regular join, S N sends the whole Nat registry relation to S I (or, vice versa, S I sends the whole Insurance relation to S N ), who computes the result of the join. If the join is executed as a semi-join, where S I acts as master, S I sends to S N the projection of Insurance on Holder. S N then sends back to S I Nat registry joined with the list of values of Holder received from S I . Finally, S I computes the result of the join between the relation received from S N and its relation Insurance.
We assign to each node of a query tree plan a server or a pair of servers, called executor , responsible for the execution of the algebraic operation represented by the node. To formally capture this intuitive idea, we introduce the definition of the executor assignment function λ T as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Executor assignment). Given a query tree plan T (N ,E ), an executor assignment function λ T : N → S × (S∪{null}) assigns to each node a pair of servers such that:
1. each leaf node (corresponding to a base relation R) is assigned the pair [S, null], with S the server where R is stored;
2. each non-leaf node n, corresponding to unary operation op on operand R l (left child) at server S l , is assigned the pair [S l ,null];
3. each non-leaf node n, corresponding to a join on operands R l (left child) at server S l and R r (right child)
at server S r , is assigned a pair [master,slave] such that master ∈ {S l , S r }, slave ∈ {S l , S r ,null}, and master =slave.
Given a query plan, we need to determine an assignment of the computation steps to different servers, in such a way that the execution given by the assignment entails only views allowed by the authorizations. This concept is captured by the following definition of safe assignment.
Definition 4.2 (Safe assignment).
Given a query tree plan T (N ,E ), a node n∈N , and an executor assignment function λ T , λ T (n) is said to be safe if one of the following conditions hold: 1) n is a leaf node; 2) n corresponds to a unary operation; 3) n corresponds to a join and all the views derived by the assignment are authorized.
The executor assignment λ T is said to be safe iff ∀n ∈ N , λ T (n) is safe.
A query plan is feasible iff there exists a safe assignment for it, as captured by the following definition. 
Third party involvement
As already discussed, the execution of joins necessarily requires some communication of information among the operands, which we check against authorizations and allow only if authorized. It may happen that, for a given join, none of the four possible modes of execution in Figure 5 corresponds to a safe assignment, but the join could be safely executed with the consideration of a third party acting either as proxy for one of the two operands or as coordinator for the join evaluation. To find a safe executor assignment for the join, it is therefore necessary to verify whether one or more third parties can be involved in the computation of the join.
The following theorem proves that the maximum number of third parties that may need to be involved is equal to the number of conditions in the join path.
, the maximum number of parties necessary to evaluate an equi-join R l J lr R r , with
Proof: See Appendix.
While the consideration of a third party can bring great advantage in many cases, it is instead clearly impractical, as well as undesirable, to consider an arbitrary number of parties (and check all the possible ways for executing a join that could therefore arise). In this paper, we therefore consider the case where only one third party can participate in the join operation. This assumption keeps the computational cost of the algorithm limited, since the number of ways in which a join operation can be safely evaluated remains low. Figure 6 summarizes the different ways considered in the paper in which a third party S t can be involved.
We briefly comment them here.
• [S t ,null]: the third party S t receives the relations from the operands and independently computes the (regular) join.
• [S t ,S l ] and [S t ,S r ]: the third party S t replaces S r (S l , resp.) in the computation with the role of master, with S l (S r , resp.) in the role of slave.
• [S l ,S t ] and [S r ,S t ]: the third party S t replaces S r (S l , resp.) in the computation with the role of slave, with S l (S r , resp.) in the role of master.
• [S t ,S l S r ]: the third party S t takes the role of master in charge of computing the join with S l and S r both working as slaves. In this case, each of the operands computes the projection of its attributes that participate in the join and sends it to the third party. The third party computes the join between the two inputs and sends back the result to each of the operands, each of which joins the input with its relation and returns the result to the third party. The third party can now join the relations received from the operands and compute the result.
Note that the first five scenarios are a simple adaptation of those already seen in the previous section, with the third party only acting as proxy, which therefore needs to have the authorization to view the relation of the party for which it acts as proxy as well as the view required by its role (master/slave). The latter scenario
is instead a little more complex and, as it can be easily seen from the table, entails different data views. In this scenario, the third party is required to only view the tuples of the operands that participate in the join (it does not need to have the complete view on one of the operand relations as it is when it acts as proxy). Also, each of the slaves is required only to view the attributes of the other relation that joins with itself (instead of the complete set of attributes).
The consideration of a third party requires to slightly change the executor assignment definition (Definition 4.1) which becomes as follows.
Definition 4.4 (Executor assignment (with third party))
. Given a query plan T (N ,E ), an executor assignment
is an assignment of pairs of servers to nodes such that:
1. each leaf node (corresponding to a base relation R) is assigned the pair [S, null], where S is the server where R is stored;
2. each non-leaf node n, corresponding to unary operation op on operand R l (left child) at server S l , is assigned a pair [S l ,null];
at server S r , is assigned a pair [master,slaves] such that master ∈ S, slaves
master =slaves, and at least one between master and slaves is in
The definition of views required by an execution remains as before (with the note that the views of the third party are now also included). The definition of safe assignment and feasible query plan also remain unchanged.
Example 4.2. Consider query q 2 in Example 2.2 and the set of authorizations in Figure 3 . The join between
Insurance and Hospital (node n 1 in Figure 2 ) can be safely assigned neither to S I nor to S H . It is then necessary to resort to the intervention of a third party, which is S N . A safe assignment for the given operation
In fact, S N can act as slave, as a proxy for S I , since it is authorized to access the whole content of the Insurance relation (authorization 9) and attribute Patient (authorization 10). S H can act as master since it is authorized to view the Holder, Plan, and Patient attributes, provided prior enforcement of join condition
Holder,Patient (authorization 5).
We can now state our problem as follows.
Problem 4.1. Given a query plan T (N ,E ) and a set of authorizations A: 1) determine if T is feasible and 2)
retrieve a safe assignment λ T for it, assuming possible involvement of third parties.
In the next section, we illustrate an algorithm that, given a query tree plan and a set of authorizations, determines if the plan is feasible and, if so, returns a safe assignment for it.
Algorithm
We follow two basic principles in the determination of a safe assignment: i) we favor semi-joins (in contrast to regular joins); ii) if more servers are candidate to safely execute a join operation, we prefer the server that is involved in a higher number of join operations. To this aim, we associate, with each candidate server, a counter that keeps track of the number of join operations for which the server is a candidate.
The algorithm in Figure 7 receives in input the set A of authorizations and a query tree plan T (N , E ) and, if T is feasible, returns a safe executor assignment λ T for it (solving Problem 4.1). Each node n in the query tree plan is associated with the following variables: n.left and n.right are the left and right children; n.operator and n.parameter are the operation and its parameters; n.leftslave and n.rightslave are the left and right slaves;
n.candidates is a list of records of the form [server ,fromchild ,counter ] stating candidate servers, the child (left, right, left right, third, third left, third right) it comes from, and the number of joins for which the server is a candidate in the subtree rooted at n; n.executor.master and n.executor.slave represent the executor assignment computed by the algorithm for n (i.e., λ T (n)); and [n.π,n. ,n.σ] is the profile of the node. We assume that for each leaf node n (base relation R) the list n.candidates of candidate executors is initialized to [server , ,0], where server is the server storing the relation. Also, variables n.executor.master and n.executor.slave are set to server and null, respectively.
The algorithm performs two traversals of tree T . The first traversal (procedure Find candidates) visits the tree in post-order . At each node n, the profile of the node is computed (as described in Figure 4 ) based on the profiles of its children and on the operation associated with the node. Then, the set n.candidates of possible candidate executors for the node is computed by analyzing the candidate executors of its children. If the node is a unary operation, the candidate executors for the node are all the candidate executors of its only child (we suppose that if a node has only one child, it is the left one). If the node is a join operation, procedure
Find candidates proceeds by checking whether the candidate executors of its left and right children can act as slave and master, respectively, and vice versa (i.e., it then verifies whether the left and right candidate executors can act as master and slave, respectively). To this purpose, the procedure considers the candidate executors of the left child in decreasing order of join counter (GetFirst) and stops at the first candidate executor found that can serve as left slave (inserting it into local variable leftslave). The procedure then examines all the candidate executors of the right child to determine if they can work as master for a semi-join (if a left slave was found) or for a regular join (if no left slave was found). Note that while we need to identify all the servers that can act as master, as we need to consider all possible candidate executors for propagating them upwards in the tree, it is sufficient to identify one slave (a slave is not propagated upward in the tree). For each right candidate executor server identified for node n, the triple [server ,right,counter] is added to the n.candidates list, where counter is the counter that was associated with server in the right child of the node incremented by one (as candidate executor also for the join of the father, the server would execute one additional join compared to the number it would have executed at the child level). Then, the procedure proceeds symmetrically to determine whether there is a candidate from the right child (considering the candidates in decreasing order of counter) that can work as slave and, as before, stops at the first candidate found that can serve as right slave (inserting it into local variable rightslave). After that, the procedure examines all the candidate executors of the left child of the node. In particular, for each left candidate executor server , the procedure first checks if server already appears Note that procedure Find candidates calls function Can view whenever it is necessary to verify whether a server can work as slave/master for a semi-join or can execute a regular join. Can view takes in input the profile of the view that should be made visible in the execution of an operation along with a server and returns true if the view is authorized.
At the end of this process, list candidates contains all the candidate servers coming from either the left or right child that can execute the join in any of the execution modes involving only the two operand parties ( Figure 5 ).
If no candidate executor was found, the algorithm determines whether the operation can be executed with the intervention of a third party (different from the candidate executors of the left and right children of the node)
by calling function Find third party (Figure 8 ). Similarly for the cases above, function Find third party enforces the controls necessary to verify whether there are third parties authorized to evaluate the join operation according to the strategies reported in Figure 6 . The function receives in input the current node n for which candidates list is empty, along with the corresponding sets leftmasters and rightmasters, and returns a possible list of candidate executors. The function checks the following four cases in the order, applying two main principles: i) solutions where the third party acts as slave are preferred to solutions where it acts as master to avoid the propagation of the third party up in the tree; ii) semi-joins are preferred to regular joins. Note that the case where the third party acts as coordinator is the last option, since it is less efficient than all the other execution modes. The function stops at the first case that produces a candidate list that is not null. If the call to function Find third party does not return any candidate executor, the algorithm exits returning the node at which the process was interrupted (i.e., for which no safe assignment exists) signaling that the tree plan is not feasible.
If Find candidates completes successfully, the algorithm proceeds with the second traversal of the query tree plan. The second traversal (procedure Assign ex in Figure 9 ) recursively visits the tree in pre-order . At the root node, if more assignments are possible, the candidate server with the highest join counter is chosen.
Hence, the chosen candidate executor is pushed down to the child(s) from which it comes in the post-order traversal, and the selected slave is pushed down to the other child. If no slave was recorded as possible (i.e., rightslave/leftslave=null or the slave is a third party) a null value is pushed down. At each child, the master executor is determined as the server pushed down by the parent (if it is not null) or the candidate server with the highest join counter and the process is recursively repeated, until a leaf node is reached.
Example 5.1. Consider the two query plans in Figure 2 (reported also in Figure 10 for convenience) and the set of authorizations in Figure 3 . Figure 10 illustrates the working of procedures Find candidates and Assign ex reporting the nodes in the order they are considered by the procedures and the candidates/executors determined.
Candidates/executors with a "*" are those of the leaf nodes (already given in input). To illustrate the working, let us look at some sample calls.
Consider query q 1 and, in particular, call Find candidates(n 2 ). Among the candidates of the children (S I from left child n 4 , and S N from right child n 5 ) only the right child candidate S N survives as candidate for the join, which needs to be executed as a regular join since the only candidate from the left child cannot serve as The executor assignment computed by procedure Assign ex implicitly determines the flows of information among cooperating servers necessary for query execution. These data exchanges practically translate into send and receive operations, which permit to transfer a set of tuples from a server (the sender) to another (the receiver).
Example 5.2. Consider the query plans and executor assignments in Figure 10 . Figure 11 illustrates the server responsible for the evaluation of each operation in the plan and the data exchanges these assignments imply.
Each box delimits the operations for which each server is responsible and edges across boxes represent flows of information between servers.
For the evaluation of query q 1 , S N is responsible for the evaluation of the (regular) join of relations Insurance and Nat registry. Therefore, S I sends to S N its relation. The evaluation of the join represented by node n 1 requires instead the cooperation of S H , working as master, and S N , working as slave. As a consequence, S H sends the projection of attribute Patient to S N , which can then restrict the set of tuples resulting from the evaluation of n 2 and send back the result to S H . S H locally holds all the information to complete the evaluation of the query. The evaluation of query q 2 is analogous.
The correctness of the algorithm is proved by showing that: i) the algorithm always terminates, ii) the returned executor assignment (if any) is safe, and iii) if there exists a safe assignment for a query tree plan, the algorithm finds it. The following theorem states the correctness of the algorithm.
Theorem 5.1 (Correctness). Given a query tree plan T (N ,E ), a set A of authorizations, and a set S of servers, Algorithm 5.1: i) terminates, ii) computes an executor assignment for T that is safe; iii) is always able to find a safe executor assignment for T , if T is feasible.
The time complexity of the algorithm is linear in the size of its input parameters, as stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 (Complexity). Given a query tree plan T (N ,E ), a set A of authorizations, and a set S of servers, the time complexity of Algorithm 5.1 is O(|N | · |S| · |A|).
Distributed architecture
We briefly discuss the integration of our approach with distributed query processing architectures. In distributed databases the processing of queries is typically supported by a distributed query optimizer, which has access to a complete description of the relation schemas and statistic profiles. The distributed query optimizer, available on a location known by clients, receives the query request and produces a plan for the distributed query. The distributed optimizer is essentially an extension of a traditional centralized SQL query optimizer. Compared to a centralized optimizer, it also has to take into account all the parameters of the distributed system that have an impact on query execution. The use of a single query optimizer is supported by the experience in the construction of distributed relational systems, which has shown that a fully distributed approach, using negotiation among the servers to identify the query plan, would be too complex and considerably impact performances, since it would require a complex protocol for the exchange of the costs of the different alternatives and the identification of a globally optimal solution.
The main impact of the model proposed in this paper on the distributed system architecture is the need for the query optimizer to consider the authorizations defined by each server to determine a proper assignment compliant with the authorizations. As discussed in Section 4.1, depending on authorizations, the join operators can be realized in a variety of ways, characterized by different assignments of operators to servers. The portion of the database catalog accessed by the optimizer to identify a query plan has then to be extended with the description of all the authorizations.
The services of the distributed query optimizer are invoked by any client that desires to execute a query (see Figure 12 ). The Access control and server assignment module receives from the client a query (step 2 in Figure 12 ) that requires distributed computation. It first checks if the user is authorized for the profile resulting from the query and, if the user is not authorized, the Access control and server assignment module returns an error message. Otherwise, it identifies an efficient execution plan able to return to the requesting user the result of the query (steps 2-5 in Figure 12) . The client can then execute the query, by dispatching to the servers in the network the assigned portions of the plan (step 6 in Figure 12 ).
It is important to note that, to satisfy basic security requirements, an adequate identity infrastructure has to be available to guarantee the satisfaction of the authorizations defined on the data. The identity infrastructure will support the authentication of all the parties involved: clients, servers, and the distributed query optimizer.
Security also requires to consider the integrity of the catalog, describing the database schemas and the associated authorizations. The query optimizer is a relatively large software component, typically designed without paying attention to security requirements: it is important that security does not rely on it and the architecture in Figure 12 satisfies this requirement by isolating the optimizer from the evaluation of security aspects. To guarantee query safety, it is sufficient to assume trust in the catalog, which contains the user authorizations, and in the Access control and server assignment module, which computes the safety checks as described by procedure Find candidates. Signatures on the plan will support each server in determining that the portion of the plan the server is responsible to execute complies with all the specified authorizations.
We consider the integration with an optimizer using a 2-phase process for the identification of the distributed query execution plan. This is an approach currently employed by several distributed query optimizers [17] : 1) the query optimizer identifies an efficient query plan, analogous to the one it would produce for a centralized system, e.g., using dynamic programming for the identification of the plan; 2) the query optimizer assigns operations to the distinct servers in the system, realizing the site selection phase. Our algorithm nicely fits into such a 2-phase structure. Specifically, the first phase of the optimization process produces a query plan that can be immediately used as input to the Find candidates procedure, which labels every node with the identifiers of the servers authorized to execute the operator. The second phase of the optimization process represents instead the activity realized by procedure Assign ex, which selects a server for each node among those that have been identified as candidates by the first phase. Procedure Assign ex applies a greedy selection aiming to minimize information flow and parties involvement (favoring, among the candidate executors of a node, the server assigned to its ancestors). The procedure guarantees to identify a safe assignment, if one exists. Other site assignment techniques [8, 16] can be easily adapted in this scenario.
Finally, we observe that our approach is applicable to both dynamic and static queries. Dynamic queries are queries that are created at run-time by a user or an application. Dynamic queries are processed by the query optimizer and executed immediately after optimization; the execution plan is typically discarded after the query has completed. Dynamic queries always consider the current state of every component of the system and therefore updates to the policy are automatically taken into consideration. Static queries are instead queries that appear within the code of an application, within SQL procedures or in programs using SQL Embedded. These queries are typically processed by the query optimizer at compile-time, creating an object representation of the query plan that will be directly executed at every query invocation. The specific issue that needs to be taken into account for static queries is the impact that changes on policies have on a query plan, because an authorized query plan can become invalid, for example, if a policy is modified by dropping a privilege required at some point in the plan. Fortunately, the mechanisms within relational databases already support the representation of dependencies for query plans, making it easy to introduce an explicit management of dependencies of compiled query plans on policy updates. In other words, by specifying a dependency between a query plan and the authorizations supporting it, possible changes to the policy will automatically invalidate the query plan forcing its recomputation next time the query is executed.
Related work
The lines of research that have an impact on the presented proposal can be classified into two categories. On one hand we have classical works on the management of queries in centralized and distributed systems [3, 6, 7, 17, 19, 23, 25] ; these approaches describe how efficient query plans can be obtained, but do not take into consideration constraints on attribute visibility for servers. On the other hand, in light of the crucial role that security has in the construction of future large-scale distributed applications, a significant amount of research has recently focused on the problem of processing distributed queries under protection requirements. Most of these works [5, 13, 14, 15, 18, 21] are based on the concept of access pattern, a profile associated with each relation/view, where each attribute has a value that may either be i or o (i.e., input or output). When accessing a relation, the values for all i attributes must be supplied to obtain the corresponding values of o attributes. Also, queries are represented in terms of Datalog, a query language based on the logic programming paradigm. The main goal of all these works is that of identifying the classes of queries that a given set of access patterns can support; a secondary goal is the definition of query plans that match the profiles of the involved relations, while minimizing some cost parameters (e.g., the number of accesses to data sources [5] ).
To this aim, relations not explicitly belonging to the query are possibly involved. The main difference between the work on access patterns and the approach presented in this paper is that our proposal can be considered a natural extension of the approach normally used to describe database privileges in a relational schema. Our solution essentially introduces only a mechanism to define access privileges on join paths; instead, access patterns describe authorizations as special formulas in a logic programming language for data access. In our view, the two models are complementary and both needed, in the same way as both procedural and declarative languages are typically considered in the design of a relational database engine. The model we propose is certainly easier to integrate with the mechanisms and approaches that are used by current database servers (and are familiar to database administrators). Also, the model presented in this paper explicitly manages a scenario with different independent subjects who may cooperate in the execution of a query, whereas the work done on access patterns only considers two actors, the owner of the data and a single user accessing the data. The problem of guaranteeing data security in the distributed database scenario has also been studied in [4] , where the authors propose a view-based access control system for restricting both access to data and information flows. The access control policies regulating access to a view are derived from the policies regulating access to the base tables used in the view definition. Access to a view is permitted only if the view is valid , meaning that the server that defined the view holds all the privileges for its computation and granted the requester the right to access the content of the view itself. The main goal of this work is that of identifying the server where to define, store, and enforce access control rules both on base tables and on views. The approach in [4] addresses therefore issues complementary to those presented in this paper, which illustrates an approach for expressing authorizations regulating information exchanges among servers and for executing queries entailing only information exchanges allowed by the authorizations.
Our proposal also exploits the results on authorization composition presented in [10] . The novelty of this proposal is that data release is not subject to the simple relation profile-authorization control, but a relation (base or resulting from the evaluation of a query) can be released whenever the information carried by the relation (either directly or indirectly due to the dependence of the query result with other data not explicitly released) is legitimate according to the authorizations explicitly specified for the requesting subject. Therefore, the definition of safe authorization composition is proposed. Also, the process of composing authorizations is proved to be efficient, since it runs in polynomial time in the number of authorizations.
Sovereign joins [1] are an alternative solution for secure information sharing. This method, differently from our, is based on a secure coprocessor, which is involved in query execution, and exploits cryptography to grant privacy. The advantage of sovereign joins is that they extend the plans that allow an execution in the scenario we present; the main obstacle is represented by their high computational cost, due to the use of specific asymmetric cryptography primitives, which make them currently not applicable when large collections of sensitive information must be combined (this is the reason we chose not to consider them in the construction of the plan).
Other related work is represented by approaches enforcing access control in federated systems [9, 12, 20, 24] .
Such approaches however mostly focus on the merging of security specifications, and therefore solving possible inconsistencies among them, towards the establishment of a common security policy for regulating the federated system. Furthermore, they do not address the problem of processing distributed queries under protection requirements. Such solutions are therefore not applicable to our problem where the goal is to maintain complete independence of the different parties that need only to participate in the distributed computation.
Conclusions
Adequate support for the integration of information sources detained by distinct parties is an important requirement for future information systems. A crucial issue in this respect is the definition of integration mechanisms that correctly satisfy the commercial and business policies of the organizations owning the data. To solve this problem, we propose a new model based on the characterization of access privileges for a set of servers on the components of a relational schema. Compared to other proposals, the model promises to be more directly applicable to current infrastructures and presents a greater compatibility with the basic features of current DBMSs, which are at the heart of all modern information systems.
A Proofs of theorems
A.1 Maximum number of third parties A li ,A ri , is n.
Proof: Suppose that R l is stored at S l , R r is stored at S r , and that S l and S r are characterized by the following authorizations.
•
These authorizations state that servers S l and S r are authorized to access the relations they store and each of the attributes in the other relation, but only if joined with their relation.
Let S 1 ,. . .,S n+1 ∈S be a set of servers in the system characterized by the following authorizations.
These authorizations state that each S i is authorized to access the i-th attribute in R l and in R r , projected from the join between R l and R r evaluated on i−1 j=1 A lj , A rj . Note that S n+1 only is authorized to access the table resulting from the join between R l and R r , on condition
The equi-join between R l and R r on J lr cannot be directly evaluated by S l and S r . However, it can be safely evaluated by resorting to S 1 ,. . .,S n+1 . First, server S 1 acts as coordinator for the join operation, receiving from S l and S r the relations π A l 1 (R l ) and π Ar 1 (R r ), respectively. Server S 1 then computes the join
between the received relations and sends the result back to both S l and S r .
Then, S l computes the join R l1 = R l J 1 and S r computes the join R r1 = R r J 1 , which are used in the following step of computation in place of R l and R r , respectively. At the i-th step (for i = 1, . . . , (n − 1)) of the computation, server S i acts as coordinator for the join operation, receiving from S l and S r the projection of attribute A li and A ri , respectively, on the partial result computed at step i − 1 (i.e., R li−1 and R ri−1 ). Server S i then computes the join between the received relations and sends the result back to both S l and S r , which compute the join between the data received from S i and the relation obtained by the previous i − 1 computation steps. Finally, server S n+1 receives from both S r and S l their partial results computed at step n, and computes the final result of the equi-join operation between R l and R r on condition
A.2 Correctness of Algorithm 5.1
Before proving the correctness of Algorithm 5.1 (Theorem 5.1), we introduce three lemmas that will be used in the proof of the main theorem.
Lemma A.1 establishes the correctness of the relation profiles associated with the nodes in a query tree plan and computed by the algorithm.
Lemma A.1. Given a query tree plan T (N ,E ), a set A of authorizations, and a set S of servers, Algorithm 5.1 associates with each node n∈N a relation profile that correctly reflects the information content of the relation resulting from the evaluation of the operator at node n.
Proof: The prove is by induction on the nodes of T .
Base case. If n is a leaf node, the corresponding profile [n.π,n. ,n.σ] is initialized to the value [R,∅,∅], where R is the relation represented by n. Therefore, the profile correctly represents the implied information release. is also correct the profile of n.
Lemma A.2 shows that for each node n in a query tree plan, the servers appearing in n.candidates can access the relation resulting from the execution of the operation that the node represents.
Lemma A.2. Let T (N ,E ) be a query tree plan and S be the set of servers in the system. At the end of the execution of Find candidates, n.candidates contains all and only the servers authorized to access the relation resulting from the execution of the operation represented by n, for each n∈N .
Base case. If n is a leaf node, n.candidates is initialized to [S, ,0], where S is the server storing the base relation R represented by the leaf node. Therefore, S is authorized to access R.
Induction. Consider an internal node n and suppose, by induction, that l .candidates contains only servers authorized to access the left operand R l , and that r .candidates contains only servers authorized to access the right operand R r . We prove that also n.candidates contains only servers authorized to access the relation R n resulting from the evaluation of the operation represented by n. To this purpose, we consider three cases, depending on n.operator.
• n.operator = π. Each candidate server S appearing in l .candidates is inserted in n.candidates. S appears in l .candidates because there is an authorization [A, J]→S such that (l .π∪l .σ)⊆A and l . =J. Since n.π⊆l .π, n.σ=l .σ, and n. =l . , then (n.π∪n.σ)⊆A and n. =J. Therefore, each S in n.candidates can access R n .
• n.operator = σ. Each candidate server S appearing in l .candidates is inserted in n.candidates. S appears in l .candidates because there is an authorization [A, J]→S such that (l .π∪l .σ)⊆A and l . =J. Since n.π=l .π, n.σ⊆l .π∪l .σ, and n. =l . , then (n.π∪n.σ)⊆A and n. =J. Therefore, each S in n.candidates can access R n .
• n.operator = . A server S in S is inserted in n.candidates by both procedure Find candidates and function Find third party. This may happen due to the following different cases that the procedure/function may verify.
1. S appears in rightmasters and is inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find candidates. The list rightmasters of candidates is filled in with a for loop iterating on the servers appearing in r .candidates.
A server S is inserted in rightmasters only if it has the right master view . By hypothesis, S is authorized to access R r . Also, since profiles are correctly computed (Lemma A.1) and S is authorized for the right master view , S can also access the tuples in R l participating in the join between R l and R r (i.e., π n.parameter (R r ) n.parameter R l ). As a consequence, S is also authorized to access R n .
2. S appears in regular and is inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find candidates. The list regular of candidates is filled in with a for loop scanning the servers appearing in r .candidates. A server S is inserted in regular only if it has the right full view . By hypothesis, S is authorized to access R r .
Also, since profiles are correctly computed (Lemma A.1) and S is authorized for the right full view , S can also access the whole content of R l . As a consequence, S is also authorized to access R n .
3. S appears in leftmasters and is inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find candidates. Symmetric to Case 1.
4. S appears in regular and is inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find candidates. Symmetric to Case 2.
5. S appears in leftmasters and is inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find third party. Since list leftmasters is filled in by procedure Find candidates and is not updated by function
Find third party, this case is analogous to Case 3.
6. S appears in rightmasters and is inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find third party. Since list rightmasters is filled in by procedure Find candidates and is not updated by function
Find third party, this case is analogous to Case 1.
7. S is inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find third party and is authorized both for the right master view and left full view . Since profiles are correctly computed (see Lemma A.1), and S is authorized for the right master view , S can access the tuples in R l participating in the join with R r . Since S is also authorized for the right master view , S can access the whole content of R l . As a consequence, S is also authorized to access R n .
8. S is inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find third party and is authorized both for the left master view and right full view . This case is symmetric to Case 7.
9. S is inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find third party and is authorized both for the left full view and the right full view . Since profiles are correctly computed (see Lemma A.1), and S is authorized for both the left master view and the right master view , S can access the whole content of both R l and R r . As a consequence, S is also authorized to access R n .
10. S appears in masterlist and is inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find third party. The list masterlist of candidates is filled in with a for loop iterating on the servers appearing in S\(l .candidates∪r .candidates). A server S is inserted in masterlist only if it is authorized for the left slave view , the right slave view , the left master view , and the right master view . Since profiles are correctly computed (Lemma A.1) and S is authorized for the left master view , S can access the tuples in R r participating in the join between R l and R r . Analogously, since S is authorized for the right master view , S can access the tuples in R l participating in the join between R l and R r .
Therefore, S is also authorized for R n =R l n.parameter R r .
Lemma A.3 shows that for each node n in a query tree plan, list n.candidates is finite and does not contain duplicate entries (i.e., a server appears at most once in the list).
Lemma A.3. Let T (N ,E ) be a query tree plan and S be the set of servers in the system. At the end of the execution of Find candidates, for each n∈N n.candidates does not contain duplicate entries (i.e., each S∈S is inserted at most once in n.candidates).
Base case. If n is a leaf node, then l =r =null. Also, n.candidates is initialized to [S, ,0], where S is the server storing the relation represented by n. Since n.operator is null, then n.candidates is composed of one element only and therefore cannot include duplicate entries.
Induction. Consider an internal node n and suppose that, by induction, both l .candidates and r .candidates contain at most one element for each S∈S. We prove that also n.candidates contains at most one element for each S∈S. To this purpose, we consider three cases depending on the value of n.operator.
• n.operator=π. n.candidates contains exactly the same elements as l .candidates. Therefore n.candidates contains at most one element for each S∈S.
• n.operator=σ. n.candidates contains exactly the same elements as l .candidates. Therefore n.candidates contains at most one element for each S∈S.
• n.operator= . Procedure Find candidates first inserts in n.candidates either the elements in rightmasters or the elements in regular . However, both rightmasters and regular contain only servers in r .candidates, which are inserted in rightmasters and/or in regular depending on their ability of acting as masters in a regular and/or semi-join operation. Then, procedure Find candidates proceeds in the same way with the servers in l .candidates, which are inserted in leftmasters and/or in regular depending on their ability of acting as masters in a regular and/or semi-join operation. Either leftmasters or regular are then inserted in n.candidates. Note that both leftmasters and regular cannot contain a server that already appears in n.candidates since in this situation such a server is inserted neither in leftmasters nor in regular .
Since both l .candidates and r .candidates contain at most one element for each S∈S, either n.candidates contains at most one element for each S∈S, or it is empty. In the first case, the lemma is proved. In the second case (n.candidates=∅), procedure Find candidates calls function Find third party, which returns a set list of servers, used to fill in n.candidates. Variable list may be filled in by extracting one server at time either from leftmasters and rightmasters, which do not have common candidate servers, or from the set S\(l .candidates∪r .candidates) of servers. Therefore, if function Find third party returns a set list that is not empty, then list does not contain duplicate entries.
Proof: We separately prove the three properties of the algorithm.
i) Termination
The algorithm terminates iff both procedure Find candidates and procedure Assign ex terminate.
Find candidates. Procedure Find candidates performs a post-order traversal of the tree T representing the query plan. Since each node of the tree is visited only one time, the number of recursive calls to
Find candidates is finite and is equal to the number of nodes in the tree. We therefore need to show that the visit of each node (i.e., the computations performed in correspondence of a node after the recursive calls)
terminates. The visit consists in executing for and while loops that iterate on different subsets of servers (i.e., l.candidates and r. candidates). Since the number of servers in the system is finite and by Lemma A.3, also these subsets of servers are finite. Furthermore, the loops do not add new elements in the considered sets and therefore they terminate. Each visit also calls function Can view and function Find third party. It is easy to see that these two functions terminate. As a matter of fact, function Can view is composed of a unique for loop iterating on view(S). Since the set A of authorizations in the system is finite and since view(S) is a subset of A, the function terminates. Also function Find third party terminates since its for and while loops iterate on sets of servers for which it is easy to see that they contain a finite number of servers.
Assign ex. Procedure Assign ex performs a pre-order traversal of the tree T representing the query plan.
Since each node of the tree is visited only one time, the number of recursive calls of Assign ex is finite.
Procedure Assign ex then terminates if the visit of each node terminates. The procedure is characterized by a search operation over n.candidates list. Since the set S of servers in the system is finite and by Lemma A.3, we also know that n.candidates is composed of a finite number of elements. We can conclude that procedure
Assign ex always terminates.
ii) Computation of a safe executor assignment
The prove is by contradiction. Suppose that the executor assignment computed by the algorithm is not safe. Let n be the only node of T for which the corresponding assignment is not safe. We now show that the algorithm cannot associate with n an unsafe assignment, thus contradicting the hypothesis.
• λ T (n) = [chosen.server,n.rightslave]. In this case, n.rightslave =null since otherwise the assignment would be [chosen.server,null]. Server n.rightslave is a server S extracted from r .candidates by procedure
Find candidates(n) only if S is authorized for the right slave view , that is, if S is authorized to view π n.parameter (R l ). This λ T (n) is obtained in two cases. λ T (n) is safe since chosen.server is authorized for the left master view and the right full view and n.rightslave is authorized for the right slave view .
• λ T (n) = [chosen.server,n.rightthirdslave]. In this case, chosen.fromchild=left and n.rightthirdslave =null since otherwise the assignment would be [chosen.server,null]. The third party n.rightthirdslave working as right slave is determined by function Find third party. In particular, n.rightthirdslave is a server that function Find third party extracts from S\(l .candidates∪r .candidates) only if it is authorized for both the right slave view and the left full view . Since n.rightthirdslave =null, we know that n.candidates has been determined by function Find third party and that leftmasters =null. Variable chosen then represents a server extracted from leftmasters (note that leftmasters is a subset of l .candidates) that contains servers authorized for the left master view . By Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2, λ T (n) is safe since chosen.server is authorized for the left master view and n.rightthirdslave is authorized for the right slave view and for the left full view .
• λ T (n) = [chosen.server,n.leftslave] is symmetric to the case λ T (n) = [chosen.server,n.rightslave].
• λ T (n) = [chosen.server,n.leftthirdslave] is symmetric to the case λ T (n) = [chosen.server,n.rightthirdslave].
• λ T (n) = [chosen.server,null]. Procedure Assign ex(n) assigns null to variable n.executor.slave in four cases.
1. chosen.fromchild=left and both n.leftslave and n.leftthirdslave are null. chosen is a server inserted in n.candidates by procedure Find candidates(n). In particular, if n.operator=π or n.operator=σ, chosen is also a server that appears in l .candidates and, by Lemma A.2, it can access the whole content of both R l and R n . This implies that λ T (n) is a safe assignment. Otherwise, if n.operator= , chosen is a server that procedure Find candidates(n) has inserted in n.candidates when it has added to n.candidates all servers in regular . Set regular is a subset of l .candidates and contains all servers that are authorized for the left full view . By Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2 we can then conclude that λ T (n) is a safe assignment since chosen.server is authorized for the left full view .
2. chosen.fromchild=right is symmetric to the case chosen.fromchild=left when n.operator= .
chosen.fromchild=left right.
Variable chosen is inserted in n.candidates by procedure
Find candidates(n) and chosen.fromchild is set to left right when chosen.server appears both in l .candidates and in r .candidates. It is then easy to see that chosen.server can access both R l and R r and, consequently it can compute the join operation. We can then conclude that λ T (n) is a safe assignment.
chosen.fromchild=third.
In this case, chosen is inserted in n.candidates by function
Find third party only if the server is authorized for both the left full view and the right full view .
By Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2, we can conclude that λ T (n) is a safe assignment.
• λ T (n) = [chosen.server,{n.leftslave,n.rightslave}]. In this case, since the pair {n.leftslave,n.rightslave} has been assigned to n.executor.slave, chosen.fromchild must be equal to "third" and chosen has been inserted in n.candidates by function Find third party. More precisely, chosen is a server that belongs to list masterlist and therefore is authorized for the left slave view , the right slave view , the left master view , and the right master view . If n.rightslave is not null when calling function Find third party, n.rightslave is a server extracted from r .candidates by procedure Find candidates(n) and that is authorized for the right slave view . Otherwise, n.rightslave is a server extracted from r .candidates by function
Find third party and that is authorized for the two slave view . We note here that a server authorized for the right slave view is also authorized for the two slave view . Analogously, n.leftslave is either authorized for the left slave view or the two slave view . By Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2, we can conclude that λ T (n) is a safe assignment since servers chosen.server, n.leftslave, and n.rightslave are correctly authorized.
Since any possible assignment that the algorithm can compute for n is safe, we obtain a contradiction.
iii) Determination of a safe assignment if T is feasible
The prove is by contradiction. Suppose that T is feasible and that the algorithm does not find a safe executor assignment. Let n be the only node of T for which the algorithm does not find a safe assignment. For simplicity and without loss of generality, suppose that there exists exactly one safe executor assignment for each node n in the tree (i.e., there is exactly one safe executor assignment for T ).
The algorithm cannot determine a safe assignment for n only if n.candidates remains empty since otherwise procedure Assign ex would be able to compute a safe assignment. If n.candidates is empty, the algorithm terminates after the call to Find candidates(n). However, l .candidates and r .candidates cannot be empty, since otherwise the algorithm terminates after the call to Find candidates(l ) or after the call to Find candidates(r ). Consider now the different cases that may cause n.candidates to remain empty. We now prove that if n.candidates remains empty, there is not a safe assignment for n, thus contradicting the hypothesis.
• If n.operator=π or n.operator=σ, n.candidates is empty only if l .candidates is empty, thus obtaining a contradiction.
• If n.operator= , n.candidates remains empty when the following cases happen. (f) As last attempt, function Find third party checks whether there is a third party that can act as coordinator. In this case, if list remains empty, then either n.leftslave, n.rightslave, or masterlist are null. n.rightslave is determined by extracting from r .candidates a server authorized for the two slave view . n.leftslave is determined by extracting from l .candidates a server authorized for the two slave view . masterlist is computed extracting from S\(l .candidates∪r .candidates) all servers authorized for the left slave view , the right slave view , the left master view , and the right master view . Note that it is correct to exclude from this evaluation servers in l .candidates and in r .candidates since they have been already evaluated for at least one of these views without positive results. Therefore, list remains empty and there is not a safe assignment [S t , S l S r ] for n.
Since there are no other possible safe assignments for n, we can conclude that n.candidates remains empty only if there is not a safe assignment for n, thus obtaining a contradiction. 
A.3 Complexity analysis

